Turkey wants to end the war in Ukraine—and might have a formula to do it

As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to drag on, much is uncertain about its eventual end. But one thing that is clear—and that may greatly influence how the war ends and the regional landscape afterward—is Turkey’s critical role in shaping a cease-fire and post-war arrangement.

As a major military and diplomatic power committed both to Ukraine’s survival and a modus vivendi with Russia, Turkey possesses tools to prevent escalation by Russia (as shown by its ability to push back or deter Russia in Libya and Syria) and to position itself as a country that can offer an off-ramp from war that all sides may actually support. Over the past thirty months, Ankara has given military support to Ukraine, traded with both Russia and Ukraine, convened negotiations, restricted naval traffic into the Black Sea, and cautioned its allies about taking steps that could expand the scope of the conflict. The Turks have a great interest in seeing the war contained, de-escalated, and ended sooner rather than later.

Turkey, according to its vision for the Black Sea security, has been managing what can be described as a triangular balancing act between Russia, NATO countries in the region, and non-NATO Turkish allies on or near the Black Sea. By strengthening deterrence against Russia both directly (by boosting security cooperation with Ukraine and Azerbaijan) and indirectly (by strengthening NATO’s southeast through coordination with Bulgaria and Romania), while also maintaining trade and diplomatic ties with Moscow, Ankara aims to contain the tensions that are driving the war. Not all wars end with dramatic defeat or victory; some peter out or shift to a dormant phase after strategic stalemate. If aggressor and defender reach mutual exhaustion in the coming years, that may be the least bad option for Russia, Ukraine, the region, and the West—and it would leave the Turks in an optimal strategic position, provided a settlement and assurances are in place to prevent the conflict from reemerging.

Turkey is in a position to design an off ramp—one that comports with the United States’ interests for the future of the Black Sea region—based on its triangular balancing act and its push for compromise in peace negotiations. Washington has sought to impose costs on Russia for its war in Ukraine and to deter escalations or new wars. The US strategy for the Black Sea emphasizes cooperation among littoral partners to foster economic growth and mitigate Russian influence. An off-ramp that does not directly confront or isolate Moscow may seem like it will be regarded as insufficiently robust by the United States, but the combination of deterrence and pragmatism embodied in Turkey’s triangular balancing act addresses Moscow’s incentive structure with a degree of realism.

There can be no stability in the Black Sea or security for Europe more generally until Russia’s war in Ukraine ends. Yet Russia has resources that appear to help continue Moscow’s war, and is presently maintaining, if tenuously, its levels of attrition. Economic isolation and punishment strategies have unfortunately not demonstrably changed Moscow’s commitment, and the West does not appear willing to provide further support to Ukraine due to fears of escalation. The alternative is an open-ended continuation of the war. Instead, the discussions around the future of the war should start laying out what role Russia will play in the region after combat ceases. Turkey, and its approach to peacemaking, offers unique value here: It combines enough hard power to make clear that Russia would not emerge as regional hegemon or conqueror, but leaves enough doors open to fostering ties that the Kremlin would have reasons to end the war. Theories of European and NATO security, conflict termination in Ukraine, and Black Sea stabilization must be addressed holistically—and the Turkish triangular approach accounts for both what the Russians may be willing to swallow and what the West may accept if and when Ukraine is ready.

The moral compromise involved with a nonpunitive end to Russia’s war of aggression may be repugnant, and Ukrainians retain the ultimate say on how to defend their homeland (and Americans have the say on how long to sustain major military assistance). Yet Ukrainians have considered the unpalatable possibility of years of continued war, Ukrainian defeat, and concessions, while Americans are split on an open-ended commitment to Ukrainian victory. Turkey’s triangular strategy has helped lessen the chances of an outright Ukrainian defeat and may make continued military support—with Turkish and European contributions—more sustainable for the next US administration. Even as Ankara presses for a resumption of Turkey-mediated negotiations to end the war (which the Kremlin seemingly has ruled out), Turkey is helping stiffen Ukrainian defenses, a recent example being the new joint artillery ammunition production lines the Turkish defense industry is helping US partners set up. Turkey’s strategy recognizes that ending the conflict will require both sticks and carrots, with the latter irrelevant if the former is not deployed.

Turkish support for Ukraine’s defense capabilities has been critical, despite the fact that it has been surpassed in volume by Western transfers of arms and money. Turkish drones, small arms, ammunition, armored vehicles, training, and other forms of military support played a role in keeping Kyiv in the fight between 2014 and the amplification of Western aid in mid-2022. Turkey-Ukraine defense cooperation acts as insurance against the diminution of Western aid, and dozens of joint projects have marked a symbiosis of sorts between the Turkish and Ukrainian defense sectors. For its long-term security, Ukraine can likely count on the longevity of battle-tested, durable partnerships with Turkey (and other stalwart allies such as Poland)—perhaps more than it can on continued massive US support, Russian collapse, or near-term NATO accession, none of which are ensured. Meanwhile, Ankara’s track record of stalwart support to Ukraine has not wavered over the past decade.

When evaluated against the United States’ priorities (which include ensuring Ukraine’s survival for US national security interests while minimizing US costs and risks), a Turkish off-ramp has potential value. Washington should encourage Turkey in its approach of bolstering Ukrainian defenses while pressing Russia for negotiations. In a US election year, one marked by differences between the United States and Turkey on the war in Gaza, explicit high-level coordination on the off-ramp may prove elusive, but it is enough for Washington to understand the complementarity of US interests and the Turkish approach and to help where it can in the diplomatic and defense realms.

Successful partnership between Washington, NATO’s European members, and Ankara on these matters requires a far higher degree of consultation and recognition of Turkish concerns. Such consultations can spur projects like European funding of Turkish drones for Ukraine and joint US-Turkish production of artillery ammunition for Ukraine. Partnership suffers, on the other hand, when Turkish firms are excluded from European Union-funded defense projects intended to support Ukraine. The Turkish Navy is a powerful tool for regional stability, and the recent collaboration with NATO allies Romania and Bulgaria for Black Sea demining demonstrates that the Alliance can find ways to strengthen its presence and deterrence without a sharp escalation that directly threatens Russia.

US and European partners should increase strategic consultations, develop a shared understanding of Turkey’s role in the future security architecture in the Black Sea region, and help resource it through defense industrial and military operational projects. Prospects for peace, deterrence, and regional stability would benefit greatly if they do.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

This blog is part of a joint research project of the Atlantic Council Turkey Program and the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies entitled “A Sea of Opportunities: Can the West Benefit from Turkey’s Autonomous Foreign Policy in the Black Sea?” The research provides a lens into Turkey’s aspirations for regional leadership and identifies possible avenues of collaboration between Ankara and its Western allies in the Black Sea region in several areas, such as defense and military cooperation, political and diplomatic dialogue, and maritime and energy security.

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