Ukraine needs Western support to boost its nuclear energy potential
A critical element of Russia’s strategy against Ukraine is its systematic effort to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. By bombing Ukraine’s power grid, Moscow aims to disrupt the Ukrainian war effort, cripple the Ukrainian economy, and demoralize Ukrainians. The country is currently braced for widespread blackouts during the coming winter months.
Since March 2024, Russia has decimated Ukraine’s thermal and hydro power plants. As a result, Ukraine is now reliant on the country’s nuclear industry to provide over 70 percent of its electricity needs. It is therefore vital for Ukraine to protect, sustain, and expand its nuclear power generation. Given the Soviet origin of Ukraine’s nuclear power industry, this will not be straightforward.
Obtaining parts to keep old reactors in operation while Kyiv transitions to Western nuclear technologies and expands energy production in other sectors, such as renewables, is essential. An opportunity to overcome the scarcity of parts now presents itself and must be seized to help Ukraine keep its infrastructure running and expand the country’s nuclear electricity generation as quickly as possible.
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As part of efforts to fill gaps in energy generation created by Russia’s targeted attacks, Ukraine and Bulgaria are currently pursuing a deal to transfer excess nuclear equipment intended for Bulgaria’s Belene Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to Ukraine’s Khmelnytsky NPP. This will make it possible to complete construction of reactors three and four at the Ukrainian plant.
Once Bulgaria had ruled out beginning the process of installing Russian-produced equipment at its Belene NPP, the Ukrainian Energy Ministry and Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear company, Energoatom, quickly recognized an opportunity. They saw that Bulgaria was now the only country in the world with the type of excess Russian nuclear equipment needed to complete the unfinished units at Khmelnytsky NPP.
Given that Ukraine started building the two incomplete units some years ago using Russian technology, it faced two options: Abandon the units and their power generation entirely, or access the equipment possessed by Bulgaria to safely install those components in cooperation with Energoatom’s Western nuclear industry partners to increase electricity production in Ukraine. In the process, this could lead to new shared expertise that will help countries around the world reduce and ultimately end their dependence on Russia’s Rosatom.
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Ongoing negotiations between Ukraine and Bulgaria highlight Russia’s declining energy clout in the Balkans, but this does not mean that the initiative is without challenges. On the contrary, a number of major obstacles are holding up completion of this vital deal. One is Russia’s long-standing influence in Bulgaria. This includes the activities of Kremlin proxies in Bulgaria who are working to sabotage the transfer of Bulgaria’s nuclear equipment to Ukraine. The second barrier is the financing of the potential equipment transfer.
For decades, Russia has exercised considerable influence in the Bulgarian energy, media, and political spheres. Moscow is not relinquishing its position without a fight, and is doing everything possible to maintain its standing as a decisive player in Bulgarian affairs.
A key component of Moscow’s strategy in Bulgaria is the systematic organization of a campaign, closely resembling efforts elsewhere including in Moldova and Serbia, to quash the deal with Ukraine, thereby preventing additional power generation in Ukraine and further eroding Ukraine’s efforts to end its dependence on Russia in the nuclear sphere. Earlier this year, when Ukrainian nuclear experts traveled to Bulgaria to inspect the equipment, supporters of Bulgaria’s pro-Russian Vazrazhdane (Revival) party clashed with the Ukrainian delegation and sought to prevent it from accessing the equipment.
The second key issue is financing, with talks already underway for almost two years. Bulgaria’s parliament is pressing the government to conclude the deal at a price of at least €600 million, the same price the Bulgarian National Electricity Company paid to Russia’s Atomstroyexport. Progress could be made if international partners provide Bulgaria with funding to invest in the expansion of its Kozloduy NPP, where Westinghouse will build reactors. The fact that Westinghouse is engaged in fuel production and reactor building in both Ukraine and Bulgaria is a potentially important point of intersection for the two countries and reflects why the United States in particular has an interest in the successful transfer of Bulgaria’s excess nuclear equipment to Ukraine.
Given that the purchase and transfer of the equipment would benefit Europe’s long-term energy security, there are European funds that could be used, including those available via the European Commission’s Ukraine Facility, which has a mandate to rebuild infrastructure and support the continuity of critical services such as energy transmission. The US could support the Europeans in this endeavor, including by allocating funding from its aid to Ukraine. However, Kyiv is likely to face significant transparency concerns and will need to instill stakeholder confidence.
The transfer of Bulgaria’s excess nuclear equipment to Ukraine would help address Kyiv’s electricity generation needs while also representing a major setback for Russia’s strategy in both Ukraine and the Balkans. Boosting Ukraine’s nuclear power capabilities would enhance the country’s economic outlook and position Ukraine to eventually replace Russia as a principal energy supplier to Europe in the postwar period. This makes Ukraine’s acquisition of Bulgarian nuclear power plant equipment a significant opportunity for the West that must not be missed.
Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.
The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.