Jonathan Panikoff, director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Program, testifies before the Canadian House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN) on recent Iranian activities in the region. Below are his prepared remarks.
Members of the Committee –
Thank you for the opportunity to again appear before you.
When I joined this committee about a year ago, I discussed the potential impact of a protracted war in Gaza. Today, we know the results. Hamas’s senior and mid-level leadership has been decimated; its command and control undermined; and the group today would be unlikely to be able to carry out an October 7th-style terrorist attack. But the cost has been incredibly high. Tens of thousands of Gazans have died and most homes and infrastructure has been destroyed. Even if the war ended today, humanitarian experts note the situation in Gaza is so dire it’s likely to take at least 18 months of consistent humanitarian aid before reconstruction could even meaningfully begin.
The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar may be an opportunity for renewed diplomatic negotiations that could lead to the end of the war. But that potential depends largely on leadership intentions, including who succeeds him. If it’s an individual outside of Gaza, or the committee of five based in Doha, it would indicate a greater willingness by the group to consider a hostage deal and ceasefire.
But Prime Minister Netanyahu would also have to sign off on such a deal. Domestic political pressure in Israel, on both the left and right, will play a role. But more importantly, reaching a deal would probably compel Israel to finally have to reckon with the need for an end of conflict strategy.
Right now, the options Israel is likely to find acceptable to ensure its security all have significant flaws. Option one: Israel can occupy Gaza permanently; option two: Israel can temporarily occupy Gaza until another force comes to take its place; option three: an international force could immediately take over control of Gaza. But the idea of a Palestinian or Turkish or other Arab force alone providing security, is likely to be insufficient for Israelis across the political spectrum whose minimum-security requirements have permanently changed in the aftermath of October 7th.
Unfortunately, Israel’s minimum security requirements don’t intersect with the minimum political demands of Palestinians, Arab states, and much of the global community. Reconciling those differences will be among the greatest challenges in the coming months and years as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict enters a new and potentially more daunting phase.
Unlike the conflict in Gaza, Israeli political and security officials are far more unified in their view that the situation related to Hizballah was simply intolerable, with 70,000 or so Israeli citizens unable to return to their homes in the north. US efforts to seek an off-ramp in which Hizballah forces would move back from the border by 10 – 12 kilometers remains a key component of any future deal but may no longer be enough to end Israeli operations in Lebanon.
The threat from Hizballah has been eighteen years in the making. Despite hundreds of Israeli interdiction strikes, Hizballah’s weapons inventory is now compromised of 150,000 – 200,000 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, rockets, and other weapons. Following the 2006 war, UN Security Council resolution 1701 was supposed to prevent such a buildup. But the failure of the Lebanese Armed Forces to enforce the resolution’s prohibition on armed groups south of the Litani river, and UNIFIL’s observer-only mandate, has made it possible for Hizballah to have a weapons inventory that enables the group to strike anywhere in Israel. And while it should be acknowledged that Israel has repeatedly violated 1701 by crossing into Lebanese airspace, it’s a catch-22; Israel’s actions were aimed at eliminating the people and weapons systems who were supposed to have been cleared out of the area years before.
Israel’s recent effort over the last three months to decimate Hizballah’s leadership, command and control, rank and file, and weapons, has been hugely successful. But since its ground operation began, deaths of non-combatants have quickly started to rise and approximately one million people have been displaced. And like in Gaza, Israel’s strategic end game remains unclear.
For years, inter- and intra- Lebanese Sunni, Shia, and Christian tensions, combined with Hizballah’s ultimate veto over the government, has diminished Beirut’s ability to effectively function. Hizballah’s decline could be an opportunity for both Lebanon and the region. Many in Lebanon would welcome the opportunity to rid the country of Iranian influence that has been the hidden hand dominating and undermining Lebanon for decades. But they are also opposed to perpetual Israeli freedom of action in southern Lebanon that would undermine Lebanese sovereignty. That leaves few options, even as discussions over an enhanced 1701 generate interest.
Meanwhile, as the world awaits Israel’s response to Iran’s October 1 ballistic missile attack, the potential that it moves the situation up the escalatory ladder and ultimately leads to a broader war is real. But domestic Iranian political and military constraints could also prevent significant escalation.
Iran almost certainly continues to not want to engage in a full-scale war with Israel. Iran’s attacks in April and earlier this month were probably intended to cause more damage than they did. But their failure to do so, Israel’s precision response in the spring, followed by its killing of Haniyeh in Tehran in July, and actions against Hizballah the last three months, almost certainly has reinforced for Iran that it is overmatched militarily – a notion likely to be hammered home following Israel’s coming response.
Moreover, the regime continues to prioritize its stability above all else. The last six months have demonstrated that Washington, and some western allies, will not hesitate to defend Israel. If Iran moves up the escalatory ladder, it could risk bringing the US directly into conflict with Iran, something that is probably a redline in Tehran even for those who would advocate hitting back at Israel after its upcoming response.
Finally, Iran’s front lines of defense are increasingly in peril. Hizballah has long been Iran’s pointy end of the spear and though still lethal, it is significantly diminished. Hamas is fractured and lacks sufficient room in Gaza to maneuver operationally. Shia militants in Iraq and Syria are limited in their capabilities. And the Houthis are the group supported by Iran, that Tehran probably has the least control over. Iran will not want to accelerate the weaking of its own proxy network by entering a full-scale war it cannot win.
None of this should be taken to mean there isn’t significant potential for miscalculation that could lead to a broader war – there is. But a full-scale war today prompted by increasing Iranian escalation in response to Israel, risks undermining Iran’s long-term power projections at a time when its burgeoning relationship with Russia offers opportunities that have not yet begun to be fully explored.
Iran has long demonstrated a willingness to be patient, whether out of necessity or strategic calculus. That partly ended in April as it sought to restore some deterrence against Israel; the last four months demonstrate it didn’t work. Unless Tehran believes regime survival is at risk, it is likely to be hesitant to engage in a full-scale war, cognizant its military and deterrence capabilities are limited today, but could improve in the coming years, especially with Moscow’s help.
Let me close there. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Program.
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Image: The Parliament of Canada (French: Parlement du Canada) is the federal legislative branch of Canada, seated at Parliament Hill in the national capital, Ottawa. View from the Alexandra bridge.
Jonathan Panikoff testifies before the Canadian House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence
Jonathan Panikoff, director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Program, testifies before the Canadian House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN) on recent Iranian activities in the region. Below are his prepared remarks.
Members of the Committee –
Thank you for the opportunity to again appear before you.
When I joined this committee about a year ago, I discussed the potential impact of a protracted war in Gaza. Today, we know the results. Hamas’s senior and mid-level leadership has been decimated; its command and control undermined; and the group today would be unlikely to be able to carry out an October 7th-style terrorist attack. But the cost has been incredibly high. Tens of thousands of Gazans have died and most homes and infrastructure has been destroyed. Even if the war ended today, humanitarian experts note the situation in Gaza is so dire it’s likely to take at least 18 months of consistent humanitarian aid before reconstruction could even meaningfully begin.
The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar may be an opportunity for renewed diplomatic negotiations that could lead to the end of the war. But that potential depends largely on leadership intentions, including who succeeds him. If it’s an individual outside of Gaza, or the committee of five based in Doha, it would indicate a greater willingness by the group to consider a hostage deal and ceasefire.
But Prime Minister Netanyahu would also have to sign off on such a deal. Domestic political pressure in Israel, on both the left and right, will play a role. But more importantly, reaching a deal would probably compel Israel to finally have to reckon with the need for an end of conflict strategy.
Right now, the options Israel is likely to find acceptable to ensure its security all have significant flaws. Option one: Israel can occupy Gaza permanently; option two: Israel can temporarily occupy Gaza until another force comes to take its place; option three: an international force could immediately take over control of Gaza. But the idea of a Palestinian or Turkish or other Arab force alone providing security, is likely to be insufficient for Israelis across the political spectrum whose minimum-security requirements have permanently changed in the aftermath of October 7th.
Unfortunately, Israel’s minimum security requirements don’t intersect with the minimum political demands of Palestinians, Arab states, and much of the global community. Reconciling those differences will be among the greatest challenges in the coming months and years as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict enters a new and potentially more daunting phase.
Unlike the conflict in Gaza, Israeli political and security officials are far more unified in their view that the situation related to Hizballah was simply intolerable, with 70,000 or so Israeli citizens unable to return to their homes in the north. US efforts to seek an off-ramp in which Hizballah forces would move back from the border by 10 – 12 kilometers remains a key component of any future deal but may no longer be enough to end Israeli operations in Lebanon.
The threat from Hizballah has been eighteen years in the making. Despite hundreds of Israeli interdiction strikes, Hizballah’s weapons inventory is now compromised of 150,000 – 200,000 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, rockets, and other weapons. Following the 2006 war, UN Security Council resolution 1701 was supposed to prevent such a buildup. But the failure of the Lebanese Armed Forces to enforce the resolution’s prohibition on armed groups south of the Litani river, and UNIFIL’s observer-only mandate, has made it possible for Hizballah to have a weapons inventory that enables the group to strike anywhere in Israel. And while it should be acknowledged that Israel has repeatedly violated 1701 by crossing into Lebanese airspace, it’s a catch-22; Israel’s actions were aimed at eliminating the people and weapons systems who were supposed to have been cleared out of the area years before.
Israel’s recent effort over the last three months to decimate Hizballah’s leadership, command and control, rank and file, and weapons, has been hugely successful. But since its ground operation began, deaths of non-combatants have quickly started to rise and approximately one million people have been displaced. And like in Gaza, Israel’s strategic end game remains unclear.
For years, inter- and intra- Lebanese Sunni, Shia, and Christian tensions, combined with Hizballah’s ultimate veto over the government, has diminished Beirut’s ability to effectively function. Hizballah’s decline could be an opportunity for both Lebanon and the region. Many in Lebanon would welcome the opportunity to rid the country of Iranian influence that has been the hidden hand dominating and undermining Lebanon for decades. But they are also opposed to perpetual Israeli freedom of action in southern Lebanon that would undermine Lebanese sovereignty. That leaves few options, even as discussions over an enhanced 1701 generate interest.
Meanwhile, as the world awaits Israel’s response to Iran’s October 1 ballistic missile attack, the potential that it moves the situation up the escalatory ladder and ultimately leads to a broader war is real. But domestic Iranian political and military constraints could also prevent significant escalation.
Iran almost certainly continues to not want to engage in a full-scale war with Israel. Iran’s attacks in April and earlier this month were probably intended to cause more damage than they did. But their failure to do so, Israel’s precision response in the spring, followed by its killing of Haniyeh in Tehran in July, and actions against Hizballah the last three months, almost certainly has reinforced for Iran that it is overmatched militarily – a notion likely to be hammered home following Israel’s coming response.
Moreover, the regime continues to prioritize its stability above all else. The last six months have demonstrated that Washington, and some western allies, will not hesitate to defend Israel. If Iran moves up the escalatory ladder, it could risk bringing the US directly into conflict with Iran, something that is probably a redline in Tehran even for those who would advocate hitting back at Israel after its upcoming response.
Finally, Iran’s front lines of defense are increasingly in peril. Hizballah has long been Iran’s pointy end of the spear and though still lethal, it is significantly diminished. Hamas is fractured and lacks sufficient room in Gaza to maneuver operationally. Shia militants in Iraq and Syria are limited in their capabilities. And the Houthis are the group supported by Iran, that Tehran probably has the least control over. Iran will not want to accelerate the weaking of its own proxy network by entering a full-scale war it cannot win.
None of this should be taken to mean there isn’t significant potential for miscalculation that could lead to a broader war – there is. But a full-scale war today prompted by increasing Iranian escalation in response to Israel, risks undermining Iran’s long-term power projections at a time when its burgeoning relationship with Russia offers opportunities that have not yet begun to be fully explored.
Iran has long demonstrated a willingness to be patient, whether out of necessity or strategic calculus. That partly ended in April as it sought to restore some deterrence against Israel; the last four months demonstrate it didn’t work. Unless Tehran believes regime survival is at risk, it is likely to be hesitant to engage in a full-scale war, cognizant its military and deterrence capabilities are limited today, but could improve in the coming years, especially with Moscow’s help.
Let me close there. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Program.
Further reading
Thu, Sep 19, 2024
Testimony on Israel and the Middle East at a crossroads: How Tehran’s terror campaign threatens the US and our allies
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Kirsten Fontenrose, nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, testifies before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs on how Tehran’s terror campaign threatens the US and allies. Below are her prepared remarks. Chairman Burchett, Ranking Member Phillips, and members of the Committee, thank you […]
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Jonathan Fulton, nonresident senior fellow for Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, testifies before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “China and the Middle East.” Video from the hearings and other testimonies can be found below. Below are his prepared remarks. The Middle East – North […]
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Gissou Nia testifies to House Committee on Homeland Security, and subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement & Intelligence
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Image: The Parliament of Canada (French: Parlement du Canada) is the federal legislative branch of Canada, seated at Parliament Hill in the national capital, Ottawa. View from the Alexandra bridge.
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