One year after Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attacks, here’s how the region changed

The Gaza Strip, which has been ruled by Hamas since 2007 and under an Israeli blockade for nearly two decades, has suffered widespread destruction and its infrastructure heavily damaged. Since the war began, some 41,000 have been killed, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. The humanitarian situation in Gaza has reached catastrophic levels, with Gazans facing massive food shortages, the spread of disease, and the displacement of 1.9 million people from their homes.

International efforts at the United Nations to calm tensions have been ineffectual and the decision by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to seek arrest warrants against Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Gallant, and Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar, has been met with fury in Israel and derision by Hamas. The United States, Qatar, and Egypt had early success in November of 2023 in securing a ceasefire and freeing some hostages, but since then the conflict has continued unabated, leaving the region in a fragile state of uncertainty and inching toward the possibility of a wider regional conflict.

The potential for a direct conflict between Israel and Iran has never been higher following Iran’s firing of almost two hundred ballistic missiles at the beginning of October, an event preceded by the Islamic Republic’s April barrage of over 300 missiles and drones. Houthi rebels in Yemen have spent months intermittently launching missiles into Israel while consistently attacking western shipping lines in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. And daily skirmishes along the Israel-Lebanon border led to dozens of deaths in both countries over the last year. A prelude, potentially, to a broader war—the likelihood of which greatly increased following Israel’s September killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and its ground invasion of southern Lebanon by the IDF.

One year on, the Gaza War remains unresolved and the potential for war across the region is becoming more likely. How is the humanitarian situation fairing? Will there be Saudi-Israeli normalization? What does the future of the Abraham Accords look like? Is there a regional war around the corner? Fourteen experts from across the Atlantic Council take on these questions in a series of short essays below.

Israel’s relations with the United States

Israel has settled into a routine known colloquially as the “new normal,” where the fabric of daily life is interwoven with threads of ever-present crisis. One year since the brutal October 7, 2023, massacre wrought by Hamas, and amid the repercussions of that day’s devastating aftermath—including multiple “hot” battlefronts, constant dread over the fate of the captives in Gaza, and extended tours of reserve duty—Israelis are abiding a split-screen existence. They go about their regular business while simultaneously perceiving that the nation’s calendar will be stuck hopelessly on October 8, 2023.

A similar, schizophrenic rhythm pervades Israel’s relationship with its main benefactor, the United States, as matters of critical substance are intermingled tightly with considerations of domestic politics. On the one hand, the two countries remain aligned closely in their commitment to ensuring Israel’s security: The Joe Biden administration has come singularly to Israel’s aid with invaluable military, intelligence, and diplomatic assistance, thereby enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to persist in the effort to dismantle Hamas’s infrastructure and to defend against other threats, from Lebanon and Syria to Yemen and Iran. On the other hand, and at the same time, that cooperation has come under heavy assault from various constituencies in the United States and Israel, who charge that Washington has been either excessively or insufficiently supportive of its embattled ally.

These conflicting realities complicate an already problematic environment where tensions have surfaced regularly over the precise manner in which the Benjamin Netanyahu government has pursued its objectives. US initiatives to promote a hostage release and ceasefire deal in Gaza, bring a halt to fighting across the Israel-Lebanon border, institutionalize an emerging US Central Command-led regional defense architecture, and possibly deepen Israel’s integration into the wider region have stalled as Israel gives precedence to continuing IDF maneuvers in neighboring theaters of operation and resists attempts to cede control to other foreign auspices. The volatility of the current political moment—with impending elections in the US and coalition instability in Israel—amplifies these fraught dynamics.

The predicament facing Israel is almost certain to grow more acute when the next US administration assumes power in January 2025. With more questions than answers about the path forward, both presidential candidates have resorted to issuing impatient calls for Israel to draw its Gaza campaign to a close. Under these circumstances, the prime minister would be wise to hasten and proceed toward an endgame that allows Israel to ground its relations with the United States’ next president—a vital component in Israel’s national security—on a more positive footing.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

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The human toll of the October 7 attacks and hostage-taking

On the anniversary of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack and subsequent war, the immense emotional and psychological toll of Hamas’s hostage-taking continues to affect not only those held in captivity but also their families. It is undeniable and heartbreaking that the attack and the hostage-taking, which has been a prolonged event, is a view into the broader context of the profound, collective suffering of innocent people and their families on all sides of the conflict.

For the families of those still being held hostage by Hamas, the ordeal is overwhelming and persistent. They are faced with the task of advocating for their loved ones’ safe return while managing the practical and emotional devastation of an uncertain future. Every single day brings about new fears as the families navigate the complex landscape of geopolitical tensions and international negotiations. The emotional burden is deep and intense. Families must focus their entire attention on the safe return of their loved ones during an ongoing war. Their relentless advocacy and the daily fear of loss weigh heavily on them.

The emotional trauma is severe for those who lose loved ones who were held hostage. The knowledge that their loved ones’ final moments were spent in captivity intensifies the grief of the family. This difficult, complex trauma complicates the grieving process. It is a trauma that leaves families feeling devastated and trying to grapple with the harsh reality of war.

For the hostages who have been released, reintegration into society is undeniably challenging. Families rejoice because of their loved ones’ return, yet the hostages themselves are often left with lasting emotional scars, and survivor’s guilt is a heavy burden for them to carry. Often, they struggle to reconcile their release with the continued captivity or death of others with whom they were taken. The path to psychological recovery is marked with hardships, and the prolonged challenge of getting back to life is a painful reminder that the impacts of being held hostage continue after release.

The suffering caused by the Hamas hostage-taking reflects the broader human impact of the attack on October 7. It is a snapshot of the broader human loss and the emotional and psychological toll of the war and underpins the profound collective suffering that touches all those caught in the war. As international negotiations continue, it is imperative to remember each person and family representing those still being held. World leaders must make every effort to resolve the situation swiftly.

—Liz Cathcart is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Program and the executive director of the nonprofit of Hostage US.

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Humanitarian organizations face dire conditions in Gaza

Rubble cascades into the streets and waterfalls down the facades of half-standing buildings. Tents take over every inch of empty space, sewage runs through the streets, human and donkey cart traffic creep along. I’ve been to Gaza three times since October 7, 2023, on humanitarian missions with my charity, International Network for Aid, Relief and Assistance (INARA), each trip worse than the one before.

Ever since the Rafah border crossing closed with Israel’s invasion of the southernmost part of the Gaza strip, humanitarian aid—which was never at the levels needed to begin with—plummeted drastically.

At the al-Aqsa Hospital intensive care unit (ICU), I met a year-and-a-half-old toddler who needed a pediatric tracheostomy tube that was not available. If she makes it through, she will wake up and realize she is an orphan. Lying in the bed next to her was a thirteen-year-old boy with severe burns who should not have been in the ICU. But there were not enough bandages to dress his injuries regularly, which resulted in a blood infection and early sepsis.

Even more basic needs, like soap, are scarce. What is on the commercial market is grossly overpriced, and aid organizations have not been able to bring in hygiene kits in any meaningful quantity since June. The spread of communicable illnesses, from Hepatitis A to meningitis to the skin disease impetigo (a flesh-eating bacteria), is risking the lives of children whose bodies are too weak and malnourished to fight infection. This creates even more stress on hospitals that are limping along at best.

Humanitarian efforts in the war face outlandish challenges, from what Israel decides to “clear” and then, once pallets have been cleared, in being able to pick them up to deliver to the population safely. To sum it up, Gaza has been effectively split in two by Israeli forces. Crossing from the north to the south requires Israel’s permission, as do movements to any of the humanitarian aid pick-up points. However, these routes that are determined and given by Israel, especially in the south, have turned into looter and criminal gang havens. Aid organizations like INARA have repeatedly requested alternative secure routes to no avail. There was an attempt to use Gaza’s police force earlier this year to secure the roads, but Israel bombed them. More recently, another organization, ANERA, that was delivering fuel and food to the Emirati hospital, used a security escort that was bombed by Israel.

Israel doesn’t need to kill any more Gazans. Gazans are going to die in more painful ways and in higher numbers if we—humanitarian organizations—continue to be this deliberately impeded and unable to deliver what the population needs.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA).

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Iran has a strategy for Israel. Now Israel needs one for Iran.

Instead of further escalating its attacks, Israel’s military gains provide the opportunity to support diplomatic efforts in achieving a political solution. US envoy Amos Hochstein and other diplomats have been trying for months to negotiate a halt to the fighting in which Hezbollah would withdraw its forces north of the Litani River, about fifteen miles from the border with Israel. For a settlement to hold, it would need to include a plan for a strengthened United Nations force to police the area south of the river and ensure compliance. Israel’s exclusive focus on “killing its way to victory over Hezbollah” in the face of calls from the United States and European and Middle Eastern countries for a ceasefire risks increasing frictions with the United States, further isolating Israel and involving the Israeli military in “an extended offensive with ill-defined objectives prone to mission creep.”

Israel’s devastating assault on Hezbollah strengthens the diplomats’ leverage by making it clear to the group and its Iranian patron the consequences of not acquiescing to an agreement. Even if a political solution does not emerge, Israel can use an interim period without fighting to prepare for the conflict that may come and to repair regional and international ties that it can draw on in any future conflict.

More broadly, dealing with the threat from Iran, including its advancing nuclear program and the ongoing threat from its Resistance Axis, is not something that Israel can do on its own. But ending the war in Gaza with a plan for reconstruction, moderate Palestinian leadership, and ultimately, statehood can help Israel elicit the regional and international support it needs to deal with these challenges. Such a plan would open the way for Arab state engagement with Israel that could counterbalance and isolate Iran and its militant allies. It can also begin to ease criticism of the Jewish state from the United States and rehabilitate its standing in the international community—which has suffered a sharp decline due to the high number of Palestinian civilian casualties and large-scale destruction caused by its military campaign against Hamas. Israel’s relations with the United States have suffered because of the perception by the Joe Biden administration that Israel has not taken sufficient care to avoid killing civilians and that Prime Minister Netanyahu may be prolonging the war to avoid fracturing his coalition and losing power. And both Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris and Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump have indicated that they want Israel to bring the war to a close.

Iran is pursuing a long-term strategy to keep Israel under pressure, to provoke Israeli aggression that will generate regional and international backlash, and to weaken the Israeli people’s will to fight. Israel has made progress in weakening Iran’s “ring of fire” and restoring deterrence because of its military successes. But the Jewish state needs a long-term plan that can secure regional cooperation, rehabilitate its international image, maintain the support of the United States, and give the Israeli people hope of a future without endless war.

This is an excerpt from a longer piece. Read the full article here.

—Alan Pino served as the Group Chief in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs at the Central Intelligence Agency and as the National Intelligence Council’s Officer for the Near East, retiring in 2020.

IranSource

Oct 2, 2024

Iran has a strategy for Israel. Now Israel needs one for Iran.

By Alan Pino

Israel needs a long-term plan that can secure regional cooperation, rehabilitate its international image, maintain the support of the United States, and give the Israeli people hope of a future without endless war.

Conflict Iran

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Israel has lost its patience

Israel’s new offensive began on September 16 with an unprecedented attack against Hezbollah cadres using booby-trapped pagers, which exploded simultaneously. The next day, walkie-talkies exploded. The two attacks killed at least thirty-two people and wounded some 3,500. On September 20, Israel assassinated Ibrahim Aql, the head of Hezbollah military operations and commander of the Radwan Brigade, Hezbollah’s top combat unit. His death came a month and a half after Israel assassinated top Hezbollah military leader Fouad Shukr, one of several top combat commanders to have been targeted by Irael since the conflict began last October.

One important consideration that has helped keep the fighting below the threshold of all-out war is that Hezbollah has not yet begun using its more advanced weapons systems, namely its arsenal of precision-guided missiles. On September 25, it fired a single Qadir-1 liquid-fueled missile toward the headquarters of Israeli intelligence agency Mossad near Tel Aviv. The missile was intercepted by Israeli aerial defense systems, as Hezbollah no doubt expected. The launching of the missile served as a warning to Israel that Hezbollah has only used unguided legacy rockets to strike Israeli targets. It is believed to possess an arsenal numbering some 150,000 rockets and missiles of varying calibers and ranges, including precision-guided systems that carry five hundred kilogram warheads and can strike within fifty meters of their target. The reason why it has not yet resorted to more sophisticated systems is due to Iran. Tehran does not want Hezbollah, a key component of its deterrence architecture—the Resistance Axis—to become embroiled in a massive and debilitating war with Israel for the sake of Hamas in Gaza. Hezbollah is far too important an asset for Iran to waste in such a manner. If Hezbollah were to begin launching its Fateh-110 missiles, for example, into Tel Aviv and other areas of Israel, it would undoubtedly trigger a full-scale war. Iran’s caution has led to some frustration among Hezbollah cadres who would prefer using the more advanced systems to inflict real damage and pain on Israel.

Despite the intensity of Israel’s aerial campaign and targeted assassinations of Hezbollah commanders, it is against the organization’s DNA to yield to the onslaught and plea for a ceasefire. Indeed, the level of damage that Hezbollah has sustained remains unclear at present. Israeli officials have claimed that half of Hezbollah’s precision-guided rockets have been destroyed in the air strikes and that the organization is in disarray. There is little evidence so far to back such a claim. Hezbollah has escalated its rocket attacks into Israel at an increased daily rate and is hitting Israeli military targets deeper inside Israel than before. It has begun employing larger rocket systems not previously used in the one-year conflict. Its fighters are still attacking targets of opportunity—such as Israeli tanks and troop movements—along the Blue Line, the United Nations name for the Lebanon-Israel border, suggesting that the cadres remained entrenched in south Lebanon despite the aerial onslaught. On October 2, Hezbollah staged several ambushes against elite Israeli troops, killing eight soldiers and wounding several others in what was the first day of ground combat in south Lebanon.

This is an excerpt from a longer piece. Read the full article here.

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a defense and security correspondent for Janes.

MENASource

Oct 4, 2024

Israel has lost its patience

By Nicholas Blanford

Since September 16, Israel has removed the gloves to stage a massive aerial bombing campaign targeting Hezbollah’s top political and military leadership and weapons sites to force the Iran-backed group to yield and redeploy its forces away from Lebanon’s southern border.

Conflict Israel

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Don’t expect Arab states to join in a regional escalation with Iran

When politicos and pundits talk about the prospects for a “regional war” in the Middle East resulting from escalation of the border conflicts between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah respectively, what they really are predicting or fearing is a war against Iran waged by Israel and the United States. This may be couched as a defensive reaction to Iranian retaliation for the assassinations of its military commanders and its clients’ leaders, as the United States’ defense of Israel, or as a preemptive war to preclude Iranian missile strikes on Israel, but it will involve a limited number of countries.

There is little sympathy for the Iranian regime in Gulf countries or in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but that does not translate into any interest in joining in a war against Iran. In fact, the Gulf states have been “normalizing’ their relations with Iran over the last few years just as normalization between Israel and MENA states has stalled. Any participation by Gulf states in a conflict with Iran will likely be limited to some intelligence sharing and overflight approvals. It is doubtful whether states such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will permit actions against Iran launched from US bases in their territory.

The main supporter of a major war with Iran will be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has long advocated the elimination of the Islamic Republic as the only genuine way to address the threats against Israel, both by Iran’s proxies and by a nuclear-weapons-seeking rabidly anti-Israel Iranian regime. Recently, Netanyahu addressed the “noble Persian people” directly, advising them that “when Iran is finally free—and that moment will come a lot sooner than people think—everything will be different.” These regime change hints are almost certainly not welcome in the Gulf states, which saw the results of US efforts in Iraq close up and would rather deal with the devil(s) they know in Iran than with chaos that would likely extend over years.

Meanwhile, in the coming year, the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon will continue at some level. Neither Hamas nor Hezbollah is likely to end its attacks. Continuing conflict, even at a low level, will prevent any significant rebuilding in Gaza and make it very difficult for people to return to their homes in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Israel will continue to be a divided country, and the remaining living hostages may very well languish in Hamas’s hands for some time to come. And in the United States, a new president will try to balance its support for Israel with keeping American troops out of a major war with Iran.

—Richard Le Baron, former US ambassador to Kuwait, is a career diplomat with over thirty years of experience abroad and in Washington and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Israeli-Egyptian relations are on the rocks

It’s been one year since the deadly October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas militants on southern Israel that unleashed a vengeful Israeli military campaign on the Gaza Strip that has killed more than 40,000 Palestinians. The ongoing Israel-Hamas war has also taken its toll on Egyptian-Israeli relations, reversing years of progress and leaving ties between the two neighbors in tatters.

Egyptian-Israeli ties had improved significantly in the years preceding the war, especially after Israel acquiesced to Cairo’s request for help to counter an insurgency by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated militants in North Sinai. In 2013, Cairo asked for a modification to the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to allow for the deployment of additional troops and military equipment in the Sinai Peninsula. Israel gave its nod of approval, allowing approximately 66,000 troops to be stationed in the Sinai—three times the number permitted by the treaty. Israel also bolstered its security cooperation with Egypt, providing strategic assistance, including intelligence and air support, that ultimately helped Cairo contain the threat.

Egypt, in turn, maintained its tight blockade on the Gaza Strip, keeping the Rafah border crossing largely sealed and allowing only students and Palestinians seeking medical treatment to enter the country. Egypt’s destruction of hundreds of underground tunnels, used to smuggle goods and weapons to and from Gaza, along the shared border with the Gaza Strip further bolstered Egyptian-Israeli relations between 2011 and 2016.

The Israel-Hamas war, however, escalated tensions between Egypt and Israel, which, over the past year, have traded accusations and warnings over a number of contentious issues. In the early weeks of the war, controversial statements by some ultra-nationalist ministers in Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet calling on Egypt to take in displaced Palestinians and resettle them in the Sinai provoked a furious reaction from Cairo. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi insisted that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could not be resolved at the expense of other parties and warned that such a move could jeopardize the peace treaty if rockets were to be fired into Israel from the Sinai Peninsula, provoking possible retaliatory attacks from Israel. Egypt and Israel have also traded blame over the closure of the Rafah border, which led to truckloads of humanitarian aid being blocked at Rafah.

Tensions reached their peak after Israel’s takeover of the Philadelphi Corridor in May, despite earlier warnings from Cairo that this was “a red line” and “a violation of the peace treaty.” The move put the Sisi regime on the spot, prompting some Egyptian activists to call for the severing of diplomatic ties with Israel. Israel’s announcement in May that it had discovered more than eighty tunnels leading from Rafah into Egypt added insult to injury. The Egyptian regime was again left red-faced in late May after Egyptian intelligence was found to have changed the terms of a ceasefire proposal that Israel had previously signed off on before submitting it to Hamas for review.

While the peace treaty will likely remain intact, it will take a great deal of diplomacy on Israel’s part to mend fences with Egypt and restore the broken trust. If Cairo succeeds in brokering a ceasefire and hostage-exchange truce between Israel and Hamas, this may just be the game-changer needed to restore ties to their pre-war status. The onus will be on the United States to manage the rapprochement to safeguard the longstanding peace treaty and avert the risk of further regional instability.

—Shahira Amin is an Egyptian journalist, the former Deputy Head of Egypt’s Channel Nile TV, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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Eradicating Hamas means the possibility of an insurgency in Gaza

Eleven months after the most deadly terrorist attack in Israeli history, which saw 1,200 people heinously tortured and slaughtered, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has announced that 60 percent of Hamas fighters have been killed or wounded during the war in Gaza. While this figure may seem significant, it is indicative that Israel is not yet close to achieving its objectives for the war.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that the goal of the war is the “destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities.” As someone who watched the forty-seven-minute video compilation of the October 7, 2023, attack that is not available to the public, the some 2,500 Hamas terrorists did not utilize technical or strategic weapons but AK-47s, pistols, grenades, and knives, demonstrating that it is the group’s ideology, not its weapons systems, that are a threat to Israel.

With 40 percent of its fighters remaining on the battlefield, Hamas still possesses the ability to conduct a large-scale terrorist attack in the future. As such, it is doubtful that Israel will agree to end the war until Hamas is further degraded. Israel is largely done with major combat operations, having cleared Gaza City, Khan Yunis, and Rafah. That means that nearly half of Hamas’s fighters have either blended in with the civilian population or continue to hide amongst the buildings and the spiderweb of tunnels scattered throughout Gaza.

Israel is likely to have to engage in re-clearing operations throughout the Gaza Strip for a sustained period of time. Even if a short-term hostage deal is reached for the remaining hostages, there is no way that Netanyahu can allow that amount of Hamas fighters to remain and be able to credibly say that the war has been won or that Israel is safe from another major terrorist attack. This likely means many more months of sustained urban combat throughout Gaza. Israel successfully killed Hamas’s leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran, but he was quickly replaced by Yahyah Sinwar, the group’s military commander and architect of the October 7 attack.

At the same time, Israel will need to begin nation-state building in Gaza, as another stated objective is to replace Hamas as the governing authority in Gaza. Hamas has ruled Gaza by force since the last election in 2006 and presents significant risks for Israel. Recent media reports indicate that a multinational peacekeeping force of police officers is under consideration to provide security. This would be combined with a civilian administration to lead Gaza. If the local populace rejects the presence of the security force and the governing authority, it will likely lead to an insurgency.

Hamas has already stated that it will reject the presence of a multinational or foreign peacekeeping force of any kind. So whether Israel continues to pursue Hamas now or a peace agreement takes hold, Hamas will still, as an insurgent force, pose a threat to peace and stability.

In either case, Israel will have to continue to pursue Hamas in Gaza and degrade the organization further to prevent another major terrorist attack by Hamas fighters or an insurgency in postwar Gaza. There are very few scenarios in which Hamas can continue to exist in its current numbers and capacity and not pose a strategic threat to Israel.

At the moment, Hamas remains a strategic threat on the battlefield, as well as a terrorist organization with the ability to morph into a terrorist insurgency—given its current numbers and capabilities—if Israel begins to transition security and governance to another group or force.

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, where he leads the initiative’s Counter-Terrorism Project.

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Gaza is ‘the worst chapter in Palestinian living memory’

Few could have predicted that the massive war that followed the horrendous massacre Hamas launched on October 7, 2023, would persist without a resolution into its second year, making its first anniversary doubly grim and challenging. In addition to the unprecedented pain that Israelis and Palestinians have been experiencing, there are few prospects on the horizon for an end to the war, increasing the likelihood that this exceptionally bloody chapter will extend into 2025.

The escalation of violence in the West Bank that preceded October 7 has also significantly increased alongside large-scale Israeli military operations, the likes of which have not been seen in years. This, coupled with an unprecedented rise in violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinian towns and villages, has inflamed the entirety of the conflict, which has seen massive levels of public and international interest and engagement. The involvement of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, Shia militias in Iraq, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps directly in the war by attacking Israeli, US, and other targets in the region has transformed the war into a multilateral confrontation, some of which will end when the war is over, while the rest may persist well into the future.

Internally, the Palestinians continue to experience political paralysis and face an inability to end either the violence or the continued seizure and occupation of their territories by the Israeli military and the settlement enterprise. Worse for the beleaguered Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, the unprecedented global sympathy and solidarity with and attention toward the Palestinian cause has not materialized into a substantive change of realities on the ground. Beyond symbolic recognition of Palestine as a state by a handful of countries, some harsh statements against Israel, and large-scale grassroots actions in the Western world in support of Gaza, October 7 has not achieved the kind of shift that Hamas’s Yahya Sinwar may have hoped for in terms of Palestinians’ freedom or independence.

However, October 7 has succeeded in derailing Saudi Arabia’s normalization of relations with Israel. The kingdom insists that bilateral peace can only occur through the creation of a Palestinian state—something that other moderate Arab nations have also adopted as a prerequisite to play a role in Gaza’s “day after” plans. Most crucially for Sinwar, October 7 forced Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran to play direct roles in the fight against Israel in ways none of these parties could have anticipated or even wanted.

The death and destruction in Gaza are the worst chapter in Palestinian living memory, something that will take significant time to heal from. Nevertheless, this war can, should, and must be Gaza’s last. With the right support and creative visions for the future, the coastal enclave can and will be the beating heart of a future Palestinian state.

—Ahmed AlKhatib is a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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Postwar Gaza is coming

Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack and Israel’s subsequent military response should have started serious, detailed planning for postwar Gaza—by Israel, the United States, and other countries that want both security for Israel and security and self-determination for the Palestinian people. That did not happen, but the need now is even greater.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid out Israel’s goal for postwar Gaza in his July 25 speech to the US Congress: “Gaza should have a civilian administration run by Palestinians who do not seek to destroy Israel.” President Joe Biden on May 31 set the US goal of a “durable end to the war” that “brings all the hostages home, ensures Israel’s security, creates a better ‘day after’ in Gaza without Hamas in power, and sets the stage for a political settlement that provides a better future for Israelis and Palestinians alike.”

It should be obvious that military power alone will not achieve these goals. It will take an effective, sustained postwar effort—but it can be done, as experience in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrates. History teaches lessons that should be heeded by postwar planners, including Germany and Japan after World War II, but also Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan.

Who governs Gaza, or the parts of it where the shooting has gone down, is vitally important. Outside experts, Israeli political leaders, and the United Arab Emirates have all called for Gaza to be governed during a transitional period by a multi-national authority overseen by an international contact group with a robust international policing force that can prevent Hamas’s return to power and relieve Israeli forces of day-to-day security and humanitarian aid distribution responsibilities. The exit strategy would be tied to the training and equipping of a local Gazan police and gendarmerie, which the Office of the US Security Coordinator in Jerusalem knows how to do, including how to work closely with both the Palestinian Authority and Israel.

Some thorny political issues must be resolved, and only the United States can broker a resolution. All of these plans recognize that achieving Biden’s goal will require more direct US involvement than the United States has been willing to undertake. But there is no alternative that would prevent Hamas’s return to power.

Remember the meme “Winter Is Coming” from the series Games of Thrones. It warns that even as we face difficult times, we need to plan to make it through even tougher times ahead. Postwar Gaza is coming.

—Thomas Warrick, the former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security and senior advisor to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Institute.

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The future of the Abraham Accords depends on a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Despite the tragedy of Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the ensuing conflicts, the continued trauma, and the heightened turbulence across the region, the Abraham Accords are still standing. The accords, signed in 2020, represent the normalization of relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco—and stand as a testament to the power of diplomacy and the pursuit of shared interests, even in a region as complex and historically fraught as the Middle East.

However, the future of the accords cannot be fully realized without a sustainable and just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the accords have faced criticism for sidelining the Palestinian issue, there is still potential for them to serve as a framework that encourages renewed dialogue. Additionally, the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia could be a transformative development. While Riyadh has shown interest, any formal move would likely hinge on meaningful progress toward resolving the Palestinian situation. Riyadh’s participation would not only bolster the accords but could also set the stage for broader regional acceptance of Israel, further reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics and potentially opening new avenues for addressing Palestinian concerns comprehensively.

Looking ahead, the survival and success of the Abraham Accords will depend on a continued commitment from all parties to maintain open dialogue, strengthen economic ties, and foster people-to-people connections that transcend political tensions. It is essential for the signatory countries to reaffirm their dedication to these agreements, not only as a means of advancing their national interests but also as a broader contribution to regional stability. The accords may not have solved all the Middle East’s problems, but they have undeniably shifted the geopolitical landscape in a positive direction: the pursuit of lasting peace and cooperation in the Middle East.

—Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

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The potential remains for ‘integration’ between Israel and Saudi Arabia

Quiet cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia has neither frozen nor slowed one year after the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

From the onset of discussions about “integration,” the kingdom’s preferred term for envisioned relations, Saudi Arabia insisted that public formalization of the relationship would only come with parallel formalization of a path for Palestinian statehood.

This “path” looked more like a “vague concept” just before October 7. The kingdom was ready to cross the threshold if the United States threw in an upgraded defense agreement, support for Riyadh’s civilian nuclear energy aspiration, and other deal sweeteners. It was Israel who declined. Even committing to the concept was more than the governing coalition could muster.

After October 7, reading the room in the Muslim world, the kingdom firmed up the path demand. Global debates about Israel’s counter terrorism operations in Gaza make it easier for Saudi Arabia to brush off requests from corners eager for a signing ceremony that the kingdom relax its insistence on a path to two states.

Arab countries are circling the wagons around the two-state vision in the Arab Peace Initiative. With regional heavyweight Saudi Arabia politely declining to make Israeli integration into the Arab world official until Tel Aviv commits to a future Palestinian state, countries like Qatar and Kuwait are having to defend their non-normalized status less and less frequently. Even the United Arab Emirates, gobsmacked by expectations that it will underwrite a lot of Gaza’s reconstruction, is tying any funding it eventually provides to this firm path toward two states.

Meanwhile, in an electric undercurrent, Saudi Arabia and Israel proceed discreetly at pace with mind-melds in areas both hope will surge their economies, deter their enemies (and prevent the resurgence or emergence of new ones), and reduce societal stressors.

In fact, one lesson both re-learned in the year since October 7 is that return on investments made locally in the region requires resilience against unpredictable disruption, and that resilience requires strong partnerships. Saudi Arabia and Israel share an assessment of the threats to their governance models despite differences in the models themselves. And they share an assessment of the great shaping force their collaboration in areas like technology, health, food, and water security can have on the region. Do not mistake their stealth for a lack of forward motion.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. She is president of the advisory firm Red Six International and a former senior director for the Gulf on the US National Security Council, where she led the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

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Israeli domestic politics have lurched to the right post-October 7

One year after the tragic events of October 7, 2023, Israel has lurched only further to the right. Any effort to build unity among Israeli politicians—including through Benny Gantz’s initial entry into the governing coalition—was short-lived. Of the 250 hostages Hamas abducted, more than a hundred remain in captivity, and roughly half are presumed dead. The militant, populist voices of Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism parties have prevented any progress on securing a hostage deal, and they will continue to fight tirelessly to ensure a continued state of war. They have successfully hobbled the Palestinian Authority and ushered in a period of settlement growth and violence in the West Bank not seen since the second intifada. The future of Israel’s relationship with Gaza remains no more certain than it did on October 8.

One year in, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has still failed to assume responsibility for the attacks of October 7—for the historic failure of the intelligence and security institutions that he built over his cumulative seventeen years as prime minister. He has proven as nimble as ever in holding his coalition together, and the hopes of so many Israelis for early elections have all but disappeared. Israel’s economy, which has already taken a hit during the controversial judicial reforms before October 7, has been battered by the war; a second front with Hezbollah will only harm it further. Yet despite all the turmoil, Netanyahu continues to pull himself out of the dregs and is regaining popularity: Recent polls show that while the prime minister could not necessarily reconstitute a coalition, he would still receive the largest number of votes of any party were elections held today. The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and any further successes on the Northern front will only bolster his numbers further.

Israel’s left, for its part, already severely hobbled, has been decimated. Public opinion polling shows that Israeli and Palestinian views have only hardened against their neighbors. A full 66 percent of Jewish Israelis and 61 percent of Palestinians believe the other side “wants to commit genocide against them.” Right-wing views have been increasingly entrenched and mainstreamed—particularly as the once-marginal voices of Jewish nationalists now find themselves in positions of comfort and extreme influence in the government. Israel has still not recovered from the horror and loss of October 7, and the future of its leadership offers no clear path forward for a resumption of peace or prosperity for Israel in the region.

—Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

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Can international justice  make a difference in the conflict?

Questions on violations of international humanitarian law and the commission of war crimes have been at the center of many debates with deep divides in commentary following Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel on October 7 and Israel’s retaliatory bombing of Gaza, which has since extended to the West Bank and Lebanon, and which threatens the possibility of a regional war.

What is certain: Hamas and Hezbollah—non-state actors that may not even have legal advisors—are committing war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law. What is also certain: The Israeli state is committing war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law. What is less certain: Who—if any—of these actors will actually be brought to justice in a court of law.

For its part, Israeli officials seem to have decided to settle their disputes through kinetic means, not the law. In May, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced the filing of applications for arrest warrants against Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar, Mohammad Deif, and Ismail Haniyeh, and Israeli leaders Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. More than four months later, the pre-trial chamber at the ICC has yet to issue the warrants, but tellingly, the list of Hamas perpetrators is already formally down by one, with Israel killing Haniyeh in a planned operation in Tehran at the end of July and Israel claiming it killed Deif in a strike in Gaza in mid-July. In contrast, at the same time Israeli attacks continued to kill, maim, and displace civilians in Gaza in July, Netanyahu was feted by the US Congress.

Earlier in the year, much fanfare surrounded South Africa’s application against Israel for violations of the Genocide Convention at another storied institution in The Hague—the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A flurry of initial activity over provisional measures gave an initial boost to the application and invited intense media coverage, though any final ruling on the claims will be years away. The application, even in these initial stages, has had concrete impacts globally, including a Japanese defense firm ending its business in Israel following the ICJ’s January 26 order and an appeals court in The Netherlands ordering the government to block exports of fighter jet parts to Israel (which the Dutch government later challenged). But the ICJ’s rulings on provisional measures in South Africa’s genocide case against Israel and a separate advisory opinion concluding that the Israeli state’s decades-long occupation and annexation of Palestinian territory is in violation of international law has not actually stopped Israel’s continued military actions in Gaza.

The complete aversion of Hamas and Hezbollah to abiding by the laws of war, combined with Israel’s stated promise to not cooperate with the ICC and its lack of compliance with the ICJ order, leaves the question of what, if any, diplomatic or political compromise will bring an end to continued violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes. The lives of thousands of civilians depend on it.

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—Gissou Nia is a human rights lawyer and the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

Related Experts: Shalom Lipner, Arwa Damon, Nicholas Blanford, Richard LeBaron, Shahira Amin, Alex Plitsas, Ahmed F. Alkhatib, Thomas S. Warrick, Marcy Grossman, Kirsten Fontenrose, Carmiel Arbit, and Gissou Nia

Image: Israeli flags and pictures symbolising victims are placed in Copacabana beach by NGO Rio de Paz, one month on from the October 7th attack by the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil November 7, 2023. REUTERS/Ricardo Moraes