Time to make Russia worry about the West’s red lines in Ukraine

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began more than two and a half years ago, talk of Russian red lines has been a major feature of the international debate surrounding the war. Throughout this period, the Kremlin has relentlessly exploited this preoccupation with Russian red lines to fuel Western fears of escalation and limit international support for Ukraine.

With attention focused on Russia’s regular warnings, there has been virtually no discussion of the West’s own red lines. As a result, we still very little idea about what kinds of scenarios might be considered grave enough in Western capitals to warrant an escalation in support for Ukraine, or even direct military intervention.

So far, Western leaders have largely avoided the kind of confrontational tone favored by the Kremlin, preferring instead to speak about the need to deny Russia victory while pledging to stand with Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” The underwhelming language used by Kyiv’s allies has broadly matched the delivery of military aid to Ukraine, which has typically come with significant delays and often only in response to dangerous developments on the front lines in Ukraine.

This reactive approach places the West at a considerable disadvantage and hands the escalation initiative to Russia, enabling the Kremlin to set the terms of engagement for the entire war. For example, while Russia can attack civilian targets across Ukraine as it sees fit, the Russian Federation itself remains a safe haven for Putin’s forces due to restrictions imposed by the risk-averse West on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

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Western leaders have attempted to publicly impose their own red lines on just two occasions. The first instance was back in 2022 at a time when Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling was heightening concerns over a potential apocalyptic escalation. In a series of high-profile TV appearances, President Biden’s national security advisor Jake Sullivan stated that the United States had warned Russia of “catastrophic consequences” if Moscow opted to deploy nukes in Ukraine.

More recently, French President Emmanuel Macron has raised the idea of sending troops to Ukraine if the military situation necessitates such a move. Crucially, Macron has framed this in terms of geographic red lines, speaking of the need to prevent Russia from occupying Ukraine’s main Black Sea port city Odesa.

Justifying his stance regarding the possible deployment of Western soldiers to Ukraine, the French leader has been critical of what he has characterized as the West’s overly cautious response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. “I’m not ruling anything out, because we are facing someone who is not ruling anything out,” he told The Economist in May 2024. “We have undoubtedly been too hesitant by defining the limits of our action to someone who no longer has any.”

While Russia’s own red lines have been repeatedly debunked and widely mocked, it is clear that the Kremlin’s frequent threats have succeeded in shaping the Western response to the invasion of Ukraine. By setting boundaries on Western military aid to Ukraine, Moscow has sown uncertainty among Kyiv’s allies. This has undoubtedly slowed the flow of arms to Ukraine, while also limiting the Ukrainian military’s ability to use the weapons it does receive.

It remains far from clear where the West’s real red lines lie in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, or whether Western leaders would be prepared to enforce them if Russia chose to call their bluff. Nevertheless, there may be significant advantages to be gained from keeping the Kremlin guessing. After all, as President Macron has pointed out, it makes little strategic sense to inform Russia in advance of what the West is and is not prepared to do.

Instead, Western leaders could aim to establish a series of red lines that would incur serious costs if crossed. These could include geographical red lines protecting Ukraine’s southern coastline and major cities, or more specific red lines designed to restrict attacks on civilian targets such as Ukraine’s energy grid or basic municipal services. Major war crimes such as the continued mass deportation of Ukrainian children could also be addressed.

Even talking about Western red lines will no doubt be seen as too provocative in some quarters, but it should be obvious by now that allowing Russia to enjoy uncontested escalation dominance has been a costly blunder. This approach has blunted the Western response to the largest European invasion since World War II, and has forced Ukraine to fight for national survival against a military superpower while having one hand tied behind its back.

By imposing red lines of their own, Western leaders could at least partially regain the initiative and create a degree of uncertainty for the Russians that would complicate Putin’s war effort. If Moscow is no longer able to count on the West’s fear of escalation, this would only be to Ukraine’s advantage.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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Image: Paths of bullets are seen during a Russian drone strike, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Kherson, Ukraine July 26, 2024. (REUTERS/Stringer)

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