Ending the war in Ukraine requires something for everyone to hate

The war in Ukraine seems as difficult to end as it is horrific to watch. It’s a bloody puzzle: Why have Ukraine and Russia continued fighting for so long, tearing each other to pieces? Why can’t they get to a peace deal and end the slaughter?

In a recent book, I examined why some wars are so difficult to end. I found that a fundamental problem causing wars to endure is belligerents’ deep distrust that the adversary will respect a war-ending peace deal. Even when a possible war-ending deal has acceptable terms, if a belligerent thinks that its adversary will break the deal the belligerent won’t take it, and the war will grind on. 

This deep lack of trust has fueled many long and bloody wars. In 1940, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill sloughed off Germany’s peace feelers, knowing that the Nazis could not be trusted. More recently, the Syrian civil war has dragged on for more than a decade because rebel groups have no faith in the word of the Assad government. The shadow of what might happen after a peace deal is struck affects whether parties will accept a peace deal in the first place.

Of course, there is an ocean of suspicion between Moscow and Kyiv. Ukraine deeply distrusts Russia, as Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea, support for the Donbas insurgency, and 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine violate the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia agreed to respect Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty. 

Worse, some possible peace terms, such as granting Russia permanent control of the economically valuable and militarily important Donbas region, would shift the balance of power in Russia’s favor. Ukraine would be especially unlikely to accept this kind of deal, because it would expand a strengthened Russia’s incentives to break the deal down the line. This was one reason why Churchill refused to negotiate, as he feared that Nazi leader Adolf Hitler would demand British colonies and naval disarmament in any peace deal, leaving Britain helpless to resist eventual German demands for total British capitulation.

Russia, judging by its official statements, distrusts Ukraine and the West. It claims that post–Cold War NATO expansion eastward broke a commitment to respect Russia’s sphere of interest. “Thus, an absolutely unacceptable threat to us was steadily being created right on our borders,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in May 2022.

So, what options remain? How can the two sides find a way out, short of Russia grinding Ukraine to pieces, and leaving aside the unrealistic dream of Putin’s removal by a pro-peace faction in Russia?

History suggests what might and might not work. In conflicts between smaller belligerents, international peacekeepers can help ameliorate mistrust. But given Russia’s size and veto power on the United Nations Security Council, peacekeepers won’t be part of the solution. Russia cynically ignored monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe when they were sent to eastern Ukraine in the late 2010s.

The “Korea option” may also be politically challenging. Though the United States still deeply distrusted North Korea and China in 1953, Washington agreed to a ceasefire effectively ending the Korean War because South Korean security could still rest on three stout legs: an alliance between the United States and South Korea, the long-term deployment of a substantial number of US troops to the peninsula, and the US nuclear deterrent.

The Korea option for Ukraine would come with political challenges, at least in the near term. At the upcoming NATO Summit in July, the Alliance will likely outline the terms of a “bridge” to Ukraine’s accession, expanding on its 2008 soft commitment to eventual Ukrainian membership. But the politics of Ukraine actually joining NATO appear uncertain. NATO membership for the country would require the unanimous consent of allies, and one could envision Turkey, Hungary, or isolationists in the US Senate blocking this move. Indeed, it appears that in the spring of 2022, an obstacle to a possible path to ending the war emerged in part because Washington indicated that it was unwilling to consider Ukraine’s condition for a NATO-like security guarantee from the United States. 

But there is a possible way forward. Imagine that, after the war, the West were to agree not to NATO membership but rather to help Ukraine become sufficiently powerful on its own to deter future Russian attacks by providing military aid and training, as well as by helping Ukraine improve its arms industry. A recent RAND report described a variant of this approach as a “porcupine” strategy, making Ukraine a sufficiently prickly target that Russia would leave it alone.

This strategy would maintain the ability of NATO members to stay out of a future Russia-Ukraine war, making it politically palatable for the West. For Ukraine, it would represent a path to long-term security that does not rely on hopes of benign Russian intentions. And, if this promise was coupled with the sizeable carrot of Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory captured after the 2022 invasion, Ukraine could be brought on board.

For Russia, the principal attraction of this option would be a de facto, if not de jure, promise not to include Ukraine in NATO. Russia might be more likely to believe in an informal no-membership commitment if it received assurances that Turkey and Hungary would veto Ukrainian membership. Such a promise from Hungary is easy to imagine, given its recent efforts to block the European Union from even sending weapons to Ukraine. 

This kind of no-membership concession might help end the war in another way: It would be a fig leaf for Putin. Recent work reveals that Putin understood that the war was a mistake as early as March 2022. Today, he might remain open to finding a way to end the war, especially given that Russia has already suffered perhaps 150,000 military deaths and may run out of tanks and combat vehicles by summer 2025. However, without a fig-leaf concession, Putin risks being turned out of power by disaffected nationalist elites or military officers. Other dictators have sometimes lost power this way, as when Pakistan’s strongman leader Yahya Khan was overthrown after his country was vivisected in the 1971 Bangladesh War. Fig leaves can help buy the support of pro-war militaries for peace deals. In 1945, the United States’ agreement to leave the emperor alone was critical in helping the Japanese military accept otherwise unconditional surrender. 

Some might propose pursuing the porcupine strategy unilaterally, pouring aid into Ukraine without bothering to get Russian assent to a peace deal. However, the past year has shown that even if well-armed, Ukraine will find it difficult to recapture territory through offensive operations. The right kind of peace deal, agreed to by Russia, is the best means for Ukraine to recover important territory.

Critics would argue that this deal has something for everyone to hate: Ukraine gives up on its dream of NATO membership and perhaps de facto accepts the Russian occupation of Crimea, the West agrees to long-term military and economic aid to Ukraine, and Russia withdraws from post-2022 captured Ukrainian territory. But in politics and in business, parties are in the realm of a feasible deal when all of them find that deal to be painful.

Such a deal is becoming more possible because the war is a bloody stalemate for all sides. As the staggering costs of war continue to rise, all parties will become increasingly willing to strike a politically painful deal to end the war. Further, especially if Donald Trump does not win the November US presidential election and then withdraw US support for Ukraine, it is difficult for either Ukraine or Russia to imagine military victory anytime soon.

To reach peace, Ukraine and its Western partners must find a way to surmount mistrust. Doing so will not be easy. But to prevent tens if not hundreds of thousands more deaths, they must try.

Dan Reiter is the Samuel Candler Dobbs professor of political science at Emory University and author of the award-winning book, How Wars End (Princeton, 2009).

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Image: Handout photo shows Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is briefed on the fighting along the frontlines by the 92nd Separate Assault Brigade Brigade Commander Pavlo Fedosenko, May 16, 2024, in the Kharkiv region, Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the northeastern city of Kharkiv on Thursday to boost morale and reinforce troops in the region where Russian forces are trying to press their new offensive beyond border areas. “The direction remains extremely difficult, we are strengthening our units,” Zelensky said after holding a meeting in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, with his top commander and senior military leaders. Photo by Ukrainian Presidency via ABACAPRESS.COM